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YAKOV v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS 
Cite as 43[) P .2d M3 
Cal. 553 
64 Cal.Rptr. 785 
Alexis George YAI<OV, PlaIntiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Sac. 7810. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 11, 1968. 
As Modifictl on Denial of Rehearing 
Feb. 8, 1968. 
Proceeding for writ of mandate to annul 
order of Board of Medical Examiners re~ 
yoking physician's license to practice medi-
cine. The Superior Court, Sacramento 
County, William A. White, J OJ granted the 
writ, and the Board appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tobriner, J" held that con-
duct of physician in furnishing ampheta-
mine drugs, not to garner personal profit 
but to treat patients for excessive weight, 
did not exhibit such baseness, vileness 
and depravity as to constitute moral tUl'-
pitnde that would justify revocation of 
his license, even though doctor had been 
convicted for fnrpishing dangerous drugs 
without a prescription. 
Judgment annulling Board's decision 
and remanding proceedings for redeter-
mination of penalty affirmed. 
McComb, J., dissented. 
2. Mandamus ¢:;:>174, 187(9) 
Board of Medical Examiners, which 
neither requested special findings nor ob~ 
jected to generality of those rendered by 
superior court in proceeding for writ of 
mandate to annul order of Board revoking 
physician's license to practice medicine, 
waived any objection to findings based on 
specificity, and Supreme Court on appeal 
from order granting writ was required to 
assume that finding of ultimate fact in-
cluded finding of all probative facts neces-
sary to sustain it. West's Ann.Code Civ. 
Proc. §§ 634, 1094.5. 
3. Mandamus ~187(9) 
Supreme Court was required to sustain 
decision of superior court granting writ of 
mandate to annul order of Board of Medical 
Examiners revoking physician's license to 
practice medicine if it was supported by 
credible, competent evidence. West's Ann. 
Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5. 
4. Appeal and Error €=l930(1) 
In reviewing evidence, all conflicts 
must be resolved in favor of respondent, and 
all legitimate and reasonable inferences in-
dulged in to uphold verdict if possible. 
5. Appeal and Error ¢=::l996 
When two or more inferences can be 
reasonably deduced from facts, reviewing 
court is without power to substitute its de-
ductions for those of trial court. 
Opinion, Cal.App., 58 Cal.Rptr. 644, 
vacated. 6. Appeal and Error e->996 
I. Mandamus ~172J 187(9) 
In proceeding for writ of mandate to 
annul order of Board of Medical Examiners 
revoking physician's license to practice 
medicine, trial court's duty is to undertake 
independent review of evidence, and func~ 
tion of Supreme Court on appellate review 
is solely to decide whether credible, com-
petent evidence supports that court's judg-
ment. \Vest's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5. 
435 P.2d-35lj~ 
Rule that when two or more inferences 
can be reasonably deduced from facts, re-
viewing court is without power to sub-
stitute its deductions for those of trial court 
is as applicable in reviewing findings of 
judge as it is when considering jury's ver-
dict. 
7. Physicians and Surgeons e->11(2) 
Not every violation of criminal1aw con-
stitutes act of moral turpitude. West's 
Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2383. 
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8. Physicians and Surgeons ¢;:;:)11(3) 
Purpose of action seeking revocation 
of doctor's certificate is not to punish 
doctor but rather to protect public. West's 
Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2383. 
9. Physicians and Surgeons ~11(3) 
Board of Medical Examiners can seek 
to achieve legitimate punitive purpose only 
through criminal prosecution. 
10. Mandamus <$=>168(4) 
Record in mandamus proceeding to 
annul order of Board of Medical Examiners 
revoking physician's license to practice 
medicine supported conclusion of superior 
court that physician involved did not pre-
scribe drugs for personal profit motive and 
that his personal motivation was benign 
rather than evil. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 4227; West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 
1094.5. 
II. Appeal and Error <$=>842(1) 
Determination of whether or not certain 
conduct involves moral turpitude is ques-
tion of law in sense that it should be de-
cided by appellate court. 
12. Appeal and Error ~42(7) 
Ultimate conclusion to be drawn from 
undisputed facts is question of law for 
appellate court. 
13. Physicians and Surgeons ~11(2) 
Conduct of physician in furnish-
ing amphetamine drugs, not to gar-
ner personal profit but to treat patients for 
excessive weight, did not exhibit such 
baseness, vileness and depravity as to con-
stitnte moral tnrpitude that would justify 
revocation of his license, even though doc-
tor had been convicted for ;furnishing 
dangerous drugs without a prescription. 
West's Ann.Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 2384, 23-
91.5, 4211, 4227. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., E. G. 
Funke, Asst. Atty. Gen" Hubert O. Bower 
ana \ViIbur B. Thayer, Deputy Attys. Gen" 
for defendant and appellant. 
Miller, Ford & O'Neal and Charles J. 
Miller, Sacramento, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
TO BRINER, Justice. 
Subsequent to Dr. Yakov's conviction on 
nine counts of violation of section 4227 of 
the Business and Professions Code (furnish-
ing dangerous drugs without a prescription), 
the Board of Medical Examiners filed a 
statement of charges, alleging inter alia 
that the doctor was guilty of conduct in-
volving moral turpitude. After a hearing 
in which the doctor represented himself, 
the . board adopted the hearing officer's 
proposed decision revoking Dr. Yakov's 
medical certificate. 
Dr. Yakov then petitioned the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County for a writ of 
mandate under section 1094.5 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. That court concluded that 
the finding of moral turpitude was not 
sustained by the weight of the evidence. 
Because of the impossibility of determin-
ing the extent to which 'the board's finding 
of moral turpitude contributed to its de-
cision, the trial judge annulled the order, 
remanding the, cause to the board for re-
determination of the penalty. 
[1] On the board's appeal to this court, 
the question centers on the propriety of the 
trial court' 5 holding that the weight of 
the evidence does not support a finding of 
moral turpitude. As we shall' explain, in 
this type of case the trial court's duty is 
to undertake an independent review of the 
evidence; our function on appellate review 
is solely to decide whether credible, com-
petent evidence supports that court's judg-
ment. Since the record contains facts 
which sustain the decision that the doctor's 
conduct did not involve moral turpitude, we 
must affirm. 
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On June 12, 1963, Virginia Duran, a 
state agent posing as a patient, went to 
Dr. Yakov's office for treatment and pur-
chased a supply of amphetamine sufficient 
for two months' weight control treatment. 
Acceding to agent Duran's repeated re-
quests, Dr. Yakov also sold her a four-
month supply on June 19, a five-month 
month supply on J unc 25, an eleven-month 
supply on July 2, and a fifteen-month 
supply on July 10. Dr. Yakov sold to 
J cannie Moffat, also a state agent under 
orders to pose as a patient and attempt to 
induce the doctor to sell her large quantities 
of weight reducing pills, a three-month 
supply of amphetamine on May 16, 1963, a 
two-month supply on June S, a three-month 
supply on June 12, and a ten-month supply 
on June 26. On July 10, Dr. Yakov sold a 
six-month supply to Alice Orr, also in the 
employ of the state.1 
Admitting these facts, Dr. Yakov tes-
tified that at no other time had he ever 
sold a patient more than a one-month 
supply of amphetamine. About 500 of his 
patients signed a statement to the effect 
that none had ever received more than a 
one-month supply. Although the board ap-
parently attempted to find a regular patient 
of Dr. Yakov who would testify to the 
contrary, nonc was produced at the hearing. 
The three state agents testified that, 
although Dr. Yakov sometimes weighed 
them, he did not take their blood pressure 
or otherwise examine them. Dr. Yakov re-
I. The sales to tllCse three agcnts, in ad-
dition to gencrating this license revoca-
tion proceeding, served as the ground 
for the successful prosecution of Dr. 
Yakov under section 4227 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code. That sec-
tion provides: "No person shan fur-
nish any dangerous drug >I< >I< >I< ex-
cept upon the presoription of n physi-
cian, dentist, podintrist or veterinarian." 
(Italics added.) Amphetnmilles arc clas-
sified as dangerous drugs by section 
4211, subdivision (c), of the Business 
sponded that, pursuant to his general prac-
tice, he gave all of them a physical ex-
amination. Moreover, several of his pa~ 
tients testified that the doctor had always 
examined them before prescribing pills. 
The doctor conceded, however, that Moffat 
had asked for, and been given, pills for two 
of her friends whom he had not examined. 
Dr. Yakov testified that the pills which he 
dispensed were no more dangerous than 
coffee or Coca Cola. Citing a reference 
work to the effect that amphetamine is not 
habit-forming, the doctor attested that his 
patients could stop taking the pills at will. 
Several of his patients testified to cessation 
of the use of the pills for extended pe-
riods of time. The strongest evidence to 
the contrary consisted of a statement by a 
chemist agent with the Bureau of Narcotics 
Enforcement that, although amphetamine 
was not narcotic, it was habit-forming in 
the same sense as cigarettes. 
Dr. Yakov testified that he practiced in a 
neighborhood of poor people, devoted his 
life to the underprivileged, and had never 
sent a bill to a patient. Explaining that 
he began to sell these weight-reducing drugs 
only when his patients complained of the 
high drugstore charge, he stated that he 
sold the pills at one-half that price. Some 
patients testified that the charges for Dr. 
Yakov's services, including the pills, 
amounted to substantially less than those of 
other doctors. 
[2] On this evidence the superior court 
rejected, as not sustained by the weight 
of the evidence, the medical board's find-
ing of moral turpitude.2 The court's opil1-
and Profc!>sions Code. The prosecution 
under section 4227 apparently proceeded 
on the basis that, even though Dr. Yakov 
was a medical doctor, he engaged in sell-
ing pills commercially rather than "pre-
scribing" them within the meaning of the 
statutory exception. 
2. The court rendered the following find~ 
ings regarding the findings of the board: 
"nl. The finding that Petitioner was 
guilty of moral turpitude is not sup~ 
ported by the weight of the evidence .. 
( 
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ion stated: "Petitioner has engaged in the 
practice of medicine of medicine [sic] for 
twenty-six (26) years, during which pe-
riod of time he has had no disciplinary ac-
tion or complaints against him. He mini-
mizes in his own mind the theory that 
the drugs he dispensed were 'dangerous', 
comparing them to coffee, coco [sic] cola, 
etc. The record fal1s short of showing a 
profit motive in Petitioner's conduct-and 
there is much credence to Petitioner's con-
tention that his conduct was prompted by 
affirmative action of Respondent's agents. 
Not a single instance of any violation is 
shown except those mentioned." 
[3] In reviewing this matter, the set-
tled rule of Moran v. State Board of 
Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301. 
196 P.2d 20, requires tiS to sustain the trial 
court's decision if it is supported by credible, 
IV. To the extent that the finding:;;; with 
respect to extelluation or mitigation are 
based upon the finding that petitioner 
was guilty of moral turpitude, such find-
ings likewise arc not supported by the 
evidence. V. This Court cannot ascer-
tain from the record whether the same 
penalty would have been imposed had the 
Respondent recognized the absence of 
evidence sufficient to support the find-
ing that Petitioner was guilty of moral 
turpitude and (to the extent set forth 
in Finding IV above) the findings with 
respect to extenuation and mitigation." 
Although more :;;;pecific findings would 
clearly have been preferable, the board 
neither requested special findings nor 
'Objected to the generality of tlIo:;;;e ren-
dered. Under these circumstunces the 
board waived any objection based upon 
specificity, and this court must assume 
that a finding of ultimate fact includes 
a finding of aU probative facts neces-
sary to sustain it (Code Civ.Proc. § <334; 
Roppert v. Jackson (1963) 212 Ca1.App. 
2d 678, 683, 28 Cal.Rptr. 467; Corri-
gan v. Stiltz (lD05) 233 Cal.App.2d 
381, 384, 43 Cal.Rptr. 548). 
Since the findings, though general, suf· 
fice to show that the court passed upon 
the central issue in dispute, the instant 
situation is distinguishable from Almaden-
Santa Clara Vineyards v. Paul (1006) 
239 Cul.App.2d 860, 49 CuI.Rpt,. 256. 
There the Court of Appeal hcld that the 
competent evidence. In Moran, the Board 
of Medical Examiners, having found the 
doctor to be guilty of unprofessional con-
duct for prescribing narcotics, suspended 
his medical certificate for a year. Upon 
review of the board's order, the superior 
court, solely on the basis of the evidence 
introduced before the board, rendered factu-
al findings in favor of petitioner and or-
dered the decision annulled. Affirming 
the judgment of the superior court, this 
court held that the trial court was "au_ 
thorized by law to exercise its independent 
judgment on the evidence" and that "the 
ultimate power of decision rests with the 
tdal comt." (32 Cal.2d at 308. 196 P.2d at 
25.) Since its inception in 1948. the Moran 
rule has been consistently applied to de-
scribe the scope of review of decisions not 
only by the Board of Medical Examiners 3 
trial court "made no fuetual detcrminu· 
tion thut would settle the disputc and 
did not decide Olle way or the other 
whether Almaden paid Vogel in full." 
(P. 867, 49 Cal.Rptr. p. 262.) The va-
lidity of the suspension of Almaden's li-
cense turned on that issne. Au inspec· 
tion of the record there convinced the 
appellate court thHt "it was the pur-
pose and intent of the [trial] court not 
to puss upon the vivotal i.~:sue in thc 
case." (P. 808, 49 Cal.Rptr. p. 263.) 
In the instant case the trial court did 
pass upon the ph'otal issue of moral 
turpitude; thc record confirms that it 
did so, and the court's opinion sets 
forth its reasons for concluding against 
the doctOI"S guilt of moral turpitude. 
Thus. the hohling in Tringham Y. State 
Board of Education (1958) 50 Cal.2d 
507, G08, 326 P.2d 850, 851, a case 
illVolviIlg the revocation of teaching 
credentials, applies here: "The rccord 
shows that the COUI·t excrcised its inde· 
pendent judgment on the evidence ana 
determined that the board's order was 
not supported by the weight of the evi-
dence." 
3. Sec Cooper v. State Board of Medical 
Examiners (1950) 85 Ca1.2d 242, 24G, 
217 P.2d 630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593; Whitlo\v 
v. Board of Medical Examiners (1967) 
248 A.C.A. 595, 601, 56 Cal.H.Ptr. 525; 
Morris v. Board of Medical Examiners 
(1904) 230 CuI.App.2<l 704, 711, 41 Cal. 
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but also by other statewide administrative 
agencies that arc without constitutional au-
thority to exercise judicial powcrs.4 
[4-6] As we stated in Moran, supra, 32 
Cal.2d 301, 308, 196 P.2d 20, 25, quoting 
from Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. 
(1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429, 45 1'.2d 183: 
" '''In reviewing the evidence * * * 
all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the 
respondent, and all legitimate and reason-
able inferences indulged in to uphold the 
verdict if possible. * * * When two or 
morc inferences can be reasonably deduced 
from the facts, the reviewing court is with-
out power to substitute its deductions for 
those of the trial court."'" HThe rule 
quoted is as applicable in reviewing the 
findings of a judge as it is when consider-
ing a jury's verdict." (Estate of Bristol 
(1943) 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223, 143 P.2d 689, 690; 
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
supra, 32 Cal.2d 301, 308, 196 P.2d 20.) 
Thus, pursuant to Moran, the question be-
fore this court turns upon whether the evi-
dence reveals substantial support, contra-
dicted or uncontradicted, for the trial 
court's conclusion that the weight of the 
Rptr. 351, 12 A.L.R.3d 1201; Sunseri 
v. Board of Medical Examiners (1964) 
224 Cal.App.2d 309, 313, 36 Ca1.Rp!"r. 
553: Bernstein v. Board of Medical Ex-
aminers (19(32) 204 Cul.App.2d 378, 385, 
22 CaI.Rptr. 419. Of course the justifi-
cation for the de novo review by the 
trial court estahlished by Moran is par-
ticularly strong where, as in the present 
case, the various proceetlings \vill deter-
mine so vital a qUestion as a doctor's 
right to practice his profession (cf. 
Bernstein v_ Boaru of Medical Exam-
iners, supra, 204 Cal.App.2d 378, 385, 22 
Cal.Rptr. 419). 
4. Sec, e. g., Nardoni v. McConnell (1057) 
48 Ca1.2d 500, 503, 310 P.2d 644 (Insur-
ance Commissioner) ; Almaden-Snntn 
Clar.'!. Vineyards v. Paul, supra, 239 Cal. 
App.2d 860, 866, 40 Cal.RI)tr. 256 (Di-
rector of Agriculture); Caro v. Savage 
(1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 530, 538, 20 Cal. 
Rptr. 286 (Renl Estate Commission-
er); Maywood Glass Co. v_ ,Stewart 
(1959) 170 Ool.App.2d 719, 723, 339 P. 
2d 947 (Unemployment Insurance Ap-
evidence does not show Dr. Yakov to be 
guilty of conduct involving moral turpitude. 
[7-9] Vle recognize that juristic defini-
tions of moral turpitude have been general. 
For example, this court has defined moral 
turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness 
or depravity ill the private and social duties 
which a man owes to his fellow men or to 
society in general, contrary to the accepted 
and customary rule of right and duty be-
tween man and man. * * *" (In re 
Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69, 70, 307 P.2d 
625.) G Other than specifying that conduct 
involving fraud, perjury, and intentional 
dishonesty for personal gain falls within 
these broad definitions (Hallinan v. Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners, supra, 65 Ca1.2d 
447, 459, 55 Ca1.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76; In 
re Hallinan (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 243, 247, 272 
P.2d 768), the courts have not narrowed the 
inquiry by promulgating more specific def-
initions. Accordingly, we must focus on the 
general question whether the totality of the 
facts as found by the trial court, which 
we must accept under Moran, indicates 
such disregard by Dr. Yakov for the wel-
peals Board); Beach v_ Contractors 
State License Board (1957) 151 Cal. 
App.2d 117, 120, 311 P.2d 51 (Contrac-
tors State Liccnse Board); Ashdown 
v. State of California Department of 
Emplo.ymcnt (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 291, 
299, 287 P.2d 176 (Department of Em-
ployment) ; see, Kleps, Certiorarified 
Mandamus Revie,ved (1960) 12 Stan.L. 
Rev. 554_ 
5. Not every violation of the criminal law 
constitutes nn act of moral turpitude. 
(In re Disbarment of Rothrock (1940) 16 
0"1.2<1 '149. 454. lOG P.2d 907, 131 
A.L.R. 226; Hallinan v. Committee of 
Bar Examiners (1006) 65 Cal.2d 447, 
459, 55 Cal.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 7G.) 
Indeed, section 2383 of the Business 
and Professions Code neccssnrHy as~ 
sumes this conclusion by authorizing the 
medical board to examine the eir(;Ulll-
stances of the erime in order to deter-
mine whether it involves moral turpitude. 
The furnishing of dungerous drugs with-
out n presctiption mayor may not be an 
act of morul turpitude, depending on the 
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fare of his patients as to demonstrate, 
ubasenessJ vileness or depravity." «I 
[10] The record supports the trial 
court's conclusion that Dr. Yakov did not 
prescribe the drugs for a personal profit 
motive; that his personal motivation was 
benign rather than evil. The motivation of 
the doctor c"rucially affects any finding 
of his moral turpitude. Thus in Hal-
linan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 
supra, 65 Ca1.2d 447, 461, 55 Cal.Rptr. 
228, 239, 421 P.2d 76, 87, this court held 
that whether Hactivities involve moral 
turpitud€.! is dependent upon the * * * 
motivation of the violator." We shall 
point out in more detail the elements of 
Dr. Yakov's motivation. 
Both Dr. Yakov and his patients testified 
to the fact that he sought to assist them 
through the practice of selling pills at 
amounts substantially below the drugstore 
price. The board failed to introduce any 
evidence that the doctor 'enjoyed an inordi· 
nate, or indeed any, profit from his sales 
at the lower price. The board did not 
circumstances. On an issue closely re~ 
lated to the instant question, this court 
has held that the offense of furnishing 
an alcoholic beverage to a person under 
the nge of 21 does not always involve 
moral turpitude. (Lorenz v. Board of 
Medical Examiners (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 084, 
687, 298 P.2d 537.) 
6. The purpose of an action seeking revo~ 
cation of a doctor's certificate is not to 
punish the doctor but rather to protect 
the public. (Cf. In re Disbarment of 
Rothrock, supra, 16 CaJ.2d 449, 454, 106 
P.2d 907 (disbarment): Hallinan v. 
Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 65 
CaI.2d 447, 462, 55 Cal.Rptr . .Q28, 421 
P.2d 76 (certification for admission to 
the bar).) While revocation of a certifi~ 
cate certainly works an unavoidable puni~ 
tive effect, the board can seek to achieve 
a legitimate punitive purpose on1y 
through criminal prosecution. Thus, in 
this proceeding the inquiry must be lim~ 
ited to the e.ffect of Dr. Yakov's actions 
upon the quality of his se.rvice to his 
patients. 
7. The determination of wllether or not 
certain conduct involvcs "moral turpi· 
prove, or attempt to show, that the doctor's 
motive was evil. 
Dr. Yakov's testimony reveals that, at· 
though he recognized potential danger from 
any drug used incorrectly, he considered 
amphetamine no more dangerous or habit· 
forming than coffee or Coca Cola. Even 
assuming a lack of sound medical judgment 
in Dr. Yakov's appraisal of the physical 
consequences of the pills. we find no evi· 
dence of subjective intent other than to 
serve the best interests of his patients. He 
testified. as did many of his patients, that 
the pills successfully brought about weight 
reduction. 
[11-13] Dr. Yakov's sale of the pills to 
Moffat for her friends without examining 
the possible recipients, as well as his sale to 
Duran of several months' supply at weekly 
intervals, could sufficiently support a find-
ing of unprofessional conduct under section 
2391.5 of the Business and Professions 
Code. Viewing the facts, as required by 
Moran, in support of the trial court, how-
ever, we hold as a matter of law 7 
tude" is a "question of law" in the sense 
that it should be decided by an appellate 
court. (In re McAllister (1939) 14 Cal. 
2d 602, 604, 95 P.2d 932; In re Clark 
(1959) 52 CaI.2d 322. 328-329, 340 
P.2d 613; Otash v. Bureau of Private 
Investigators (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 
568, 571, 41 Ca1.Rptr. 263.) This rule 
merely exemplifies the generally accepted 
proposition that the ultimate conclusion 
to be drawn from undisputed facts is a 
question of law for an appellate court. 
(San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. 
San Diego County (1940) 16 Ca1.2d 142, 
153. 105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416; 
Sonthern Pacific Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 
170 Cal. 782, 783-784, 151 P. 277. 
L.R.A.I016E, 916: Brown. Fact and 
Law in Judicial R('view (1943) 56 Harv. 
L.Rev. 899, 901; Stern, Review of Find-
ings of Administl'ators, Judges and Ju· 
des: .A Comparative Analysis (1944) 
58 Harv.L.Rev. 70, 112, 117.) Thus. 
once the "facts" are established pursu~ 
ant to the Moran rule, this court must 
reach an independent decision as to 
whether Dr. Yakov's conduct demon-
strated moral turpitude. 
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that the doctor's conduct did not exhibit 
such "baseness, vileness and depravity" as 
to constitute moral turpitude. 
In summary, the doctor's furnishing of 
amphetamine drugs, motivated not to gar-
ner a personal profit but rather to treat pa-
tients for excessive weight, hardly reached 
the sinister sphere of moral turpitude. This 
record does not support a reversal of the 
trial court's judgment, freighted as it is 
with the presumption of propriety and 
weight that such a ruling carries in this 
kind of litigation. 
The right to practice one's profession is 
sufficiently precious to surround it with a 
panoply of legal protection. Perhaps onc 
rationalization for Moran lies in its prophy-
lactic requirement that in the instant situa-
tion the appellate court must accept the 
facts as found by the trial court, a judicial 
tribunal, rather than by the disciplinary 
board, an administrative agency. Follow-
ing that precept we cannot sustain this 
revocation of a license to practice medicine 
based upon claimed moral turpitude. 
The trial court's judgment annulling the 
board's decision and remanding the pro-
ceedings for redetermination of the penalty 
is affirmed. 
PETERS, BURKE, SULLIVAN and 
PEEK,- n., concur . 
CONCURRING OPINION 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
My views with respect to judicial revic.v 
of administrative findings of fact undet 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, are 
set forth in dissenting opinions in Moran v. 
State Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal. 
2d 301, 315, 196 P.2d 20, and Southern 
California Jockey Club, Inc. v. California 
Horse Racing Board, 36 Ca1.2d 167, 178, 
223 P .2d 1. These views remain unchanged, 
but since a majority of the court adhere to 
the Atloran case, I concur in the judgment 
under the compulsion of that case. 
DISSENTING OPINION 
McCOMB, Justice. 
I dissent. I would reverse the judgment 
with directions to the trial court to dis-
charge the alternative writ and deny the 
petition for a writ of mandate for the 
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Bray in 
the opinion prepared by him for the Court 
of Appeal in Yakov v. Board of Medical 
Examiners (Ca1.App.) 58 Ca1.Rptr. 644. 
Rehearing denied; PEEK, J., sitting pro 
tern. in place of MOSK, J.; McCOMB, J., 
dissenting. 
• Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of 
the Judicial Council 
